Unvisible US economy: tough or cool

In previous reports, we have shown how the United States has risen to its highest level since 2007, how national debt has broken $3.9 trillion, and why gold has reached record highs. This report presents the core issues that have been laid down in the first three reports: Are all of this going down

KEY DATA: 2026 Q1 GDP GROWTH 1.6% Q4 GDP GROWTH 0.5% Q1 ANNUALIZED INFLATION IN THE PERSONAL CONSUMER EXPENDITURE PRICE INDEX 4.5% UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 4.3% 2026 RECESSION PROBABILITY 19% 2027 RECESSION PROBABILITY 41% CONSUMER CREDIT CARD BALANCE 1.3 TRILLION USD

Section I - Questions every investor is asking

Bond yields continued to climb. National debt has broken $39 trillion. Inflation is stubbornly higher than the Fed's target. The policy direction of the new Fed Chairman is unclear. Oil prices have broken $100 per barrel. Tariffs push up consumer costs. These are the conditions that have been documented in the first three reports in this series, as well as the conditions that have given rise to the same problem in the minds of investors at every income level and in their experience: are we moving towards recession

As of early June 2026, honest answers were complex. The United States economy continues to grow, the labour market continues to generate new jobs and corporate profits remain generally stable. On the surface, however, a series of structural pressures that pre-date the downside of the economy are building up — pressures that are now measured quarterly rather than yearly — into a window of time for real economic contraction。

This report explains what the recession is, how economists judge it, what the leading indicators now show, and how investors have passed through it in history。

EDUCATION NOTE: RECESSION IS USUALLY DEFINED AS TWO CONSECUTIVE QUARTERS OF NEGATIVE REAL GDP GROWTH - A SIX-MONTH DECLINE IN TOTAL NATIONAL ECONOMIC OUTPUT. HOWEVER, THE OFFICIAL ADJUDICATOR FOR THE UNITED STATES RECESSION IS THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS (NBER), WHICH USES A BROADER RANGE OF CRITERIA, INCLUDING EMPLOYMENT, INCOME AND EXPENDITURE DATA. THE DEFINITION OF NBER MEANS THAT EVEN WITHOUT NEGATIVE GDP GROWTH FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE QUARTERS, RECESSIONS CAN BE DECLARED; CONVERSELY, WHEN THE TWO QUARTERLY RULES ARE TRIGGERED, NBERS ARE NOT NECESSARILY OFFICIALLY IDENTIFIED AS RECESSIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND BOTH DEFINITIONS, AS MARKETS AND THE MEDIA USUALLY USE SIMPLER TWO-QUARTER RULES, WHILE NBER HAS OFFICIAL ACCREDITATION POWERS。

Section II - Real state of the economy

Before studying warning signals, it is necessary to understand the baseline. At the beginning of 2026, the United States economy, which had not fallen into recession and was growing at a slow and uneven pace, was causing real concern among economists。

GDP GROWTH IS POSITIVE BUT CONTINUES TO SLOW. Q4 REAL GDP GROWTH IN 2025 WAS ONLY 0.5 PER CENT PER ANNUM, THE WEAKEST QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE SINCE 2022, PARTLY DUE TO THE CLOSURE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SUPPRESS FEDERAL SPENDING. IN 2026, Q1, GDP REBOUNDED TO AN ANNUALIZED RATE OF 1.6 PER CENT, FROM THE SECOND ESTIMATE PUBLISHED BY THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON 28 MAY 2026. IT'S POSITIVE, BUT IT'S FAR BELOW THE NORMAL RHYTHM OF HEALTH EXPANSION OF 2-3 PERCENT. THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS A DOWNWARD REVISION OF 0.4 PERCENTAGE POINTS DOWNWARDS FROM THE PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE ISSUED ON 30 APRIL。

INFLATION IS FAR HOTTER THAN THE HEADLINE FIGURES SHOW. THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S PREFERRED INFLATION INDICATOR – THE PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (PCE) PRICE INDEX – ROSE AT AN ANNUALIZED RATE OF 4.5 PER CENT IN 2026 Q1, THE HIGHEST READING SINCE Q3 IN 2022, AND THE HIGHEST SINCE THE PEAK OF THE POST-EPIDEMIC INFLATIONARY WAVE, MORE THAN DOUBLE THE FED’S 2 PER CENT TARGET. THE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF PCE, WHICH ELIMINATES THE FOOD AND ENERGY CORE, IS ALSO 4.3%. APRIL CPI DATA FURTHER CONFIRM INFLATION AS AT THE SAME TIME AS THE LEVEL OF 3.8 PER CENT, THE HIGHEST SINCE MAY 2024. THESE FIGURES PRECISELY EXPLAIN WHY THE FED IS IN A DILEMMA: REDUCING INTEREST RATES TO SUPPORT GROWTH, RISKING FURTHER ACCELERATION OF INFLATION; AND RAISING INTEREST RATES TO CONTAIN INFLATION, PUSHING THE ECONOMY INTO CONTRACTION。

THE COMPOSITION OF Q1 GDP IN 2026 REVEALED STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES. CONSUMPTION SPENDING GREW BY ONLY 1.4 PER CENT, MAINLY FROM DEMAND FOR SERVICES, WHILE EXPENDITURE ON CONSUMPTION OF GOODS ALMOST STAGNATED. HOUSING INVESTMENT DECLINED FOR THE FIFTH CONSECUTIVE QUARTER WITH ANNUALIZATIONS RANGING FROM 6 TO 8 PER CENT. NET TRADE SLOWED GDP GROWTH BY 1.25 PERCENTAGE POINTS, AS IMPORTS GREW AT A MUCH FASTER RATE THAN EXPORTS. BUSINESS INVESTMENT DOES SHOW STRONG PERFORMANCE — 10.1 PER CENT OVERALL GROWTH AND 17.2 PER CENT SHARPER EXPENDITURE ON EQUIPMENT — BUT THIS STRENGTH IS HIGHLY CONCENTRATED IN AI-RELATED CAPITAL SPENDING RATHER THAN IN BROAD BUSINESS EXPANSION。

THE LABOUR MARKET REMAINS RESILIENT BUT SOFTENING. NON-FARM EMPLOYMENT INCREASED BY 185,000 IN MARCH 2026 AND 115,000 IN APRIL, MAINTAINING UNEMPLOYMENT AT 4.3 PER CENT. THE FOUR INDICATORS OF RECESSION TRACKED BY NBER SHOW THAT NON-FARM EMPLOYMENT IS AT ITS HIGHEST LEVEL IN HISTORY, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IS 1.54 PER CENT LOWER THAN HISTORICAL PEAKS, REAL RETAIL SALES ARE 0.45 PER CENT LOWER THAN PEAKS AND REAL PERSONAL INCOME IS 0.31 PER CENT LOWER THAN PEAKS. THESE INDICATORS DO NOT YET HAVE RED LIGHTS ON, BUT THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE WARRANTS CONTINUED ATTENTION。

THE SOURCES OF GROWTH ARE INCREASINGLY CONCENTRATED. AN YONG (EY) ANALYSIS REVEALS A WORRYING PATTERN: PRIVATE DOMESTIC ACTUAL FINAL SALES GREW BY 2.7 PER CENT ANNUALLY IN 2026 Q1 BUT THIS GROWTH IS INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON SAVINGS CONSUMPTION, CREDIT INCREASES AND WEALTH EFFECTS, WITH A HIGH CONCENTRATION ON AI-RELATED INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES. THE DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH COMES FROM A FEW SOURCES — RICH HOUSEHOLDS AND AI CAPITAL SPENDING — WHILE THE WIDER CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING SECTORS ARE STAGNATING。

Section III - Classic indicators of recession: what do they currently show

Economists and investors track a specific set of indicators that have existed before the recession. Understanding what each indicator is measuring and what is currently showing provides the most honest picture of recessionary risk。

yield curve

The yield curve is the difference between short-term and long-term United States Treasury debt interest rates. When short-term interest rates are higher than long-term rates — that is, curves upside down — they send a warning signal. The yield curve has been upside down before each of the eight previous recessions in the United States, without exception. The experience of the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank is that the reversal of the yield curve implies a recession in about a year。

The yield curve of the United States has been inverted for most of 2022, 2023 and 2024. The curve has returned to normal patterns as long-term rates of return have subsequently risen sharply as a result of fiscal and inflation dynamics described in previous reports. The end of the upside-down does not mean the danger is over. Historical patterns suggest that recession often occurs after the yield curve has returned to normal, rather than during the upside-down period. Back-to-back is an early warning, and returning to normality is often a command gun。

World Federation of Large Enterprises leading economic index

The leading economic index (LEI) of the World Federation of Large Enterprises (World Federation of Enterprises) is a composite of 10 forward-looking indicators designed to herald a turning point in the business cycle, covering building permits, stock prices, manufacturing orders, credit conditions and consumer expectations. LEI declined by 0.6 per cent in March 2026 and by 0.1 per cent in April, but fell by 0.7 per cent in the six months between October 2025 and April 2026. The continued decline over a six-month period has historically presaged a recession six to twelve months earlier。

Sam Rules

The Sam Rules, developed by Claudia Sahm, a former Federal Reserve economist, triggered a recession when the national average of three months of unemployment moved by 0.5 percentage points or more above the average of the last 12 months. It has accurately identified the beginning of each recession since 1970, and never had a false positive. The current Sam rule reading is below the trigger threshold of 0.5%. The next data release date is 2 July 2026。

NBER FOUR INDICATORS

THE FOUR PARALLEL INDICATORS USED BY NBER TO JUDGE THE TIME OF RECESSION ARE THE LATEST AVAILABLE DATA: NON-FARM EMPLOYMENT IS AT ITS HIGHEST LEVEL IN HISTORY; INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IS 1.54 PER CENT LOWER THAN ITS HISTORICAL PEAK; REAL RETAIL SALES ARE 0.45 PER CENT LOWER THAN ITS HISTORICAL PEAK; AND REAL PERSONAL INCOME IS 0.31 PER CENT LOWER THAN ITS HISTORICAL PEAK. THESE INDICATORS ARE NOT CURRENTLY AT A LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ECONOMY IS CURRENTLY IN RECESSION。

Consumer confidence and expenditure

CONSUMPTION SPENDING IS ABOUT 70 PER CENT OF US GDP. CONSUMER "K-TYPE DIFFERENTIATION" IS A RISK: HIGH-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE TO CONSUME FREELY, SUPPORTED BY ASSET PRICE APPRECIATION, WHILE LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS RELY INCREASINGLY ON CREDIT CARDS, BEGINNING TO SHOW SIGNS OF EARLY FINANCIAL PRESSURE。

THE CREDIT CARD REVOLVING DEBT BALANCE IS APPROXIMATELY US$ 1.3 TRILLION. IN 2026 Q1, THE OVER-90-DAY OVERDUE RATE ROSE BY 10 BASIS POINTS TO 2.53 PER CENT, BUT REMAINED WELL BELOW THE PEAK OF CLOSE TO 7 PER CENT DURING THE 2008 - 2009 GREAT RECESSION. IMPORTANTLY, DEBT SERVICE RATIOS AS A PERCENTAGE OF DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME REMAIN BELOW PRE-DISEASE LEVELS, INDICATING THAT HOUSEHOLDS AS A WHOLE ARE NOT IN ACUTE DISTRESS。

Section IV — Accumulation pressure: Why is 2027 more worrying than 2026

Current probability data convey clear messages. The forecast market, Polymarket, assessed the probability of a recession in the United States by 2026 at 19 per cent and Kalshi traders at 17.5 per cent. For 2027, however, there was a significant shift in figures - according to 24/7 Wall St., the probability of recession rose to 41 per cent in 2027. This is not a small difference, but it shows that investors are increasingly convinced that the economy may be able to avoid an immediate downturn, but will face a delay in "liquidation" due to slow accumulation。

Refinancing pressure wall for corporate debt. Those businesses that borrowed at near zero interest rates between 2009 and 2021 are now refinancing maturities at 5 to 7 per cent returns. A previous bond interest rate of only 2 per cent is now three to four times as high as the original refinancing debt. This reduces profitability, reduces recruitment capacity and limits expansionary investment. This effect is not immediate — it emerges every month as debt matures — but it is structural and inevitable。

CONSUMER SAVINGS ARE DEPLETED. ERNST AND YOUNG ' S ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT THE GROWTH OF CONSUMPTION SPENDING IS INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON SAVINGS CONSUMPTION RATHER THAN REAL INCOME GROWTH. INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS RATES HAVE BEEN DECLINING. THE K-TYPE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN HIGH-INCOME AND LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME CONSUMERS MEANS THAT OVERALL DATA MASK A POTENTIALLY WORRYING DETERIORATION IN THE LOWER END OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION。

Housing blocks continue to contract. Housing investment has declined for five consecutive quarters. Against the background of 30-year mortgage rates ranging from 6.34 to 6.54 per cent, housing affordability for first-time buyers has collapsed, while existing owners have been locked away in their current accommodations. Housing has traditionally been one of the most sensitive economic sectors for interest rates, and its continued contraction is a leading sign of a broader economic weakness。

TARIFF-INFLATION-GROWTH TRAP. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY IS CURRENTLY STAGNATING — INFLATION IS HIGHER THAN THE TARGET AND GROWTH IS LOWER THAN THE TREND. THE PCE INFLATION RATE IS 4.5 PER CENT ANNUALLY AND GDP GROWTH IS ONLY 1.6 PER CENT, WHICH IS THE DEFINITION OF STAGNATION AT THE DIGITAL LEVEL. IMPORT TARIFFS PUSH CONSUMER PRICES DIRECTLY, WHILE SLOWING ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY DISRUPTING THE SUPPLY CHAIN AND RAISING THE COST OF ENTERPRISE INPUTS. THE FED CANNOT DEAL WITH TWO PROBLEMS AT THE SAME TIME: INTEREST-RATE REDUCTION TO SUPPORT GROWTH WOULD RISK FURTHER ACCELERATION OF INFLATION, AND INTEREST-RATE INFLATION CONTROL WOULD RISK CONTRACTION。

THE MAGNIFICATION EFFECT OF ENERGY SHOCKS. AS A RESULT OF THE AMERICAN-IRANIAN CONFLICT, OIL PRICES EXCEEDED $100 PER BARREL, IMPOSING AN "ENERGY TAX" ON THE ENTIRE ECONOMY. HISTORICAL ENERGY SHOCKS — 1973, 1979, 1990, 2008 — PRECEDED OR CONTRIBUTED TO EVERY MAJOR RECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE PAST 50 YEARS. EVEN WITH THE REOPENING OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, KPMG ' S ANALYSIS STATES: "EVEN WITH THE SUCCESS OF DIPLOMATIC MEDIATION, THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY IS ALREADY IN THE MOVEMENT."

EDUCATION NOTE: "STAGNATING" IS A SYNTHESIZING TERM FOR "STAGNATING" AND "INFLATION", DESCRIBING THE ECONOMY FACING BOTH SLOW GROWTH AND HIGH INFLATION. THIS IS CLEARLY QUANTIFIED IN 2026: PCE INFLATION IS 4.5% ANNUALLY, GDP GROWTH IS ONLY 1.6%, AND THE FED CANNOT REDUCE INTEREST RATES WITHOUT RISKING FURTHER ACCELERATION OF INFLATION. THE 1970S WERE THE MOST FAMOUS PRECEDENT IN HISTORY. RETARDATION TENDS TO BE MORE HARMFUL THAN DEFLATION, AS THE POLICY TOOLBOX IS INDEED CONSTRAINED。

Section 5 - History tells us what the recession is

Since World War II, the United States has experienced 12 recessions, averaging about six to seven years. No two recessions are identical in origin or severity, but a number of patterns recur。

The recession usually occurred after the Fed tightened monetary policy. The Fed's interest rate hike to control inflation would reduce borrowing, slow spending, suppress the housing market and eventually push the economy into contraction. The current situation is quite unique: the Fed has reduced its interest rate by 175 basis points since September 2024, but the long-term rate of return has increased during the interest rate reduction period – indicating that the bond market is working for the Fed to tighten。

The yield curve has been upside down since the 1960s, predicting every recession. The curve has been upside down for a long time between 2022 and 2024, and we are now in the backwinding window of history, where the risks of recession have increased dramatically。

Consensus forecasts almost never forecast a recession in advance. In December 2007, the official month of the Great Recession, the economist consensus forecast continued moderate growth. The International Monetary Fund and the Federal Reserve consistently underestimated the risks of recession several months before the onset of the actual recessions. This is not a criticism of the forecaster — the recession is extremely difficult to predict — but it is an important reason why investors should not wait for the consensus recession forecast to start thinking about restructuring their portfolios。

THE SEVERITY OF THE RECESSION VARIES WIDELY. DURING THE 2008 - 2009 GREAT RECESSION, GDP FELL BY 4.3 PER CENT FROM PEAK TO BOTTOM AND UNEMPLOYMENT REACHED 10 PER CENT. THE RECESSION IN 2001 WAS MUCH MORE MODERATE, WITH GDP FALLING BY LESS THAN 1 PER CENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT PEAKING AT 6.3 PER CENT. IF THERE IS A RECESSION IN 2027, IT IS GENERALLY EXPECTED TO BE CLOSER TO 2001 THAN TO 2008. DELOITTE'S DOWNWARD SCENARIO PROJECTS GDP TO DECLINE BY 0.4 PER CENT IN 2027, 1.0 PER CENT IN 2028, AND UNEMPLOYMENT TO 6.5 PER CENT IN 2028 — PAINFUL BUT NOT CATASTROPHIC。

STOCK MARKETS USUALLY PEAK BEFORE RECESSION BEGINS. STOCK MARKETS ARE FORWARD-LOOKING, OFTEN ABSORBING DOWNSIDE ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS BEFORE GDP DATA WEAKENS. THE STANDARD 500 INDEX REACHED ITS PEAK SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS BEFORE THE OFFICIAL BEGINNING OF THE POST-WAR RECESSION, WHICH MEANS THAT TRACKING THE RECESSION INDICATORS IS EQUALLY RELEVANT FOR INVESTORS WHOSE STOCK MARKETS DOMINATE。

Section VI - An honest probability assessment

For 2026: The probability of a technological recession is low and the forecast market is currently estimated at between 17.5 and 19 per cent. In 2026, Q1 GDP grew by 1.6 per cent, and the Atlanta Federal Reserve's GDP Now model showed that Q2 would achieve stronger ring growth. The labour market is still in new employment. Without major external shocks, the economy appears to be able to spend the remainder of 2026 at moderate and positive growth rates。

FOR 2027: THE SITUATION IS CLEARLY MORE WORRYING. THE PROBABILITY OF RECESSION IS 41 PER CENT, AND THE MARKET BASICALLY SEES IT AS A COIN GAME. CORPORATE REFINANCING PRESSURES, DEPLETION OF CONSUMER SAVINGS, SHRINKING HOUSING MARKETS, THE ANNUALIZATION OF PCE INFLATION, 4.5 PER CENT BINDING THE HANDS OF THE FED, AND THE SIMULTANEOUS CONVERGENCE OF THE LAGGING EFFECTS OF UPSIDE-DOWN YIELD CURVES CONSTITUTE RISK CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE SUBSTANTIALLY ABOVE NORMAL LEVELS。

DELOITTE’S ECONOMIC MODEL PROJECTS REAL GDP GROWTH OF ABOUT 2.2 PER CENT IN 2026, WITH A POTENTIAL DECLINE OF 0.4 PER CENT IN 2027 AND 1.0 PER CENT IN 2028 IN THE NEXT SCENARIO. THE FED PROFESSIONAL FORECASTER SURVEY SIMILARLY PROJECTED AN ACTUAL GDP GROWTH RATE OF 2.2 PER CENT IN 2026。

THE MOST IMPORTANT ANALYTICAL DISTINCTION IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "GROWTH RECESSION" — LOWER THAN THE TREND GROWTH PERIOD, WHICH FEELS LIKE RECESSION BUT TECHNICALLY DOES NOT FIT THE DEFINITION OF GDP — AND REAL ECONOMIC CONTRACTION. IF GDP GREW AT A POTENTIAL RATE OF 0.5 TO 1.5 PER CENT INSTEAD OF 2 TO 2.5 PER CENT, IT WAS NO DIFFERENT FROM RECESSION FOR THOSE HOUSEHOLDS THAT SUFFERED FROM STAGNANT REAL WAGES, RISING BORROWING COSTS AND HIGH PRICES, EVEN THOUGH OFFICIAL DATA DID NOT SHOW NEGATIVE GROWTH FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE QUARTERS。

Section VII - How different types of investors in history have weathered the recession

Equities: Not all plates are treated equally. The decline in essential consumer goods, health care and utilities during the recession was traditionally smaller than in large volumes, as demand for food, medicines and electricity did not disappear when the economy contracted. Science, technology and alternative consumer goods tend to decline most when consumer spending and business investment slow。

Fixed returns: Quality is more important than duration. In a stagnating recession, the persistence of inflation complicates the role of long-term public debt — inflation keeps the rate of return high, even if the economy weakens. Short- to medium-term, high-quality investment-grade bonds provide better risk-adjusted returns than long-term national debt in a historically stagnating environment。

Cash and equivalents. The current rate of return on short-term national debt and money market funds is about 4 to 4.5 per cent, representing the first real attractive cash return in more than a decade. The retention of part of the short-term liquidity instrument in the portfolio is both a defensive and a revenue strategy。

Gold. As documented in the previous report, gold is performing well in an environment of excessive fiscal and geopolitical risks. In stagnating recessions, gold can continue to serve as a value storage even when other assets fall。

The most important principle: recession is temporary. Every recession in the history of the United States has ended. The average duration of the post-war recession was about 10 months. The Standard 500 index has recovered from every major decline in history and has achieved positive returns in each of the 20-year rolling cycles. Those investors who sold at the bottom of the Great Recession from 2008 to 2009 and waited for certainty to re-enter the market missed one of the strongest rebounds in history. Evidence has consistently supported maintaining investment — holding a diversified portfolio suited to its own risk tolerance and making defensive adjustments where necessary — rather than trying to be precise about the timing of the cycle。

Education Note: Temporary "defensive" combination rotations in anticipation of recession usually include reduced exposure to economically sensitive sectors — technology, alternative consumer goods, finance — and increased exposure to more stable sectors — medical health, essential consumer goods, utilities. It does not imply the transfer of all funds to cash or bonds. The evidence on timing is highly unfavourable: investors who attempt to exit before the collapse and re-enter the field at the bottom are almost invariably not able to do so at any time, with a final return lower than that of the investors who are in good shape。

Section VIII - Depression monitoring dashboard: Key developments of concern

Q2 GDP DATA 2026 RELEASED LATE JULY 2026. THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WILL RELEASE THE THIRD ESTIMATE OF Q1,2026 ON 25 JUNE 2026, AND Q2,2026 DATA WILL BE PUBLISHED IN LATE JULY. IF GROWTH FALLS BELOW 1 PER CENT IN TWO CONSECUTIVE QUARTERS, RECESSIONARY FEARS WILL ESCALATE DRAMATICALLY。

Monthly data on non-farm employment. New employment in April 2026, 11.05 million, down from 185,000 in March. The addition of new monthly data that continue to be below 100,000, or any data that triggers a 0.5 per cent break of the Sam rule, will be a major negative signal。

Sam Rules, next release date 2 July 2026. The current reading is still below the 0.5% recession trigger threshold. If the unemployment rate rises significantly from 4.3% to 4.8% or higher, the Sam rules will be activated - This is one of the most reliable signs of real-time recession available。

WALSH CHAIRED THE FIRST FOMC MEETING, 16-17 JUNE. IN ORDER TO PROTECT ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE STOCK MARKET WILL BE UNDERPINNED BY A SIGNAL OF TOLERANCE FOR HIGH INFLATION. IF HE RELEASES THE HAWKS' TENDENCY TO CONTROL INFLATION THROUGH INTEREST RATE HIKES, IT WILL INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A POLICY RECESSION IN 2027。

Oil prices and the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. The agreement to reopen the Strait could remove about 0.5 to 1 per cent of the inflation contribution from the current inflation reading, giving the Fed greater policy space to support growth. Any escalation would exacerbate the stagnating pressure。

MONTHLY CONSUMER EXPENDITURE DATA. MONTHLY RETAIL SALES DATA AND PCE DATA ARE THE MOST DIRECT MEASURES TO DETERMINE WHETHER CONSUMERS ARE STILL HOLDING. ANY SIGN OF CONTRACTION IN SPENDING BY HIGH-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS WILL BE A MAJOR SIGN OF DETERIORATION IN GROWTH PROSPECTS。

Thinking about the layout framework:

Investors who believe that there may be a recession in 2027 will consider a modest rotation to defensive plates, increasing cash holdings to capture current attractive short-term rates of return, and ensuring that stock exposures are spread across industries rather than focusing on growth technology equity。

Investors who consider that low-speed growth is the most likely to sustain the scenario will maintain a broad and diversified portfolio and use any market volatility opportunities to selectively increase high-quality companies at lower valuation levels。

INVESTORS WHO BELIEVE THAT RECESSION CONCERNS ARE OVERREAD WILL FOCUS ON STILL ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET DATA, THE CONTINUING AI-DRIVEN INVESTMENT CYCLE, AND THE RESILIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY。

THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE RECESSION IS BOUND TO HAPPEN. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF RISK - THE FORECAST MARKET GIVES 41% PROBABILITY IN 2027, THE WINDOW PERIOD BEHIND THE YIELD CURVE, THE PCE ANNUALIZATION OF INFLATION, 4.5% RESTRAINT OF THE FED'S HANDS, AND THE LIMITED SPACE AVAILABLE TO THE NEW FED CHAIRMAN - — IS IT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY SOME DEFENSIVE ADJUSTMENT OF THE PORTFOLIO? THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE ANSWER IS YES, BUT IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE IS A PRUDENT ADJUSTMENT, NOT A PANIC。

Data sources

US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2026 Q1 GDP second estimate, May 28, 2026. US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2026 Q1 GDP preliminary estimate, 30 April 2026. IndexBox, US Q1 2026 GDP grew to 1.6% in May 2026. Advisor Perspectives, 2026 Q1 GDP second estimation analysis, May 28, 2026. Advisor Perspectives, four main recession indicators, 15 May 2026. EY, 2026 Q1 US GDP analysis, May 2026. CEPR, Q1 GDP analysis, 2026, April 30, 2026. KPMG, Q1 GDP below expected analysis, April 30, 2026. CNBC, March 2026 PCE inflation data, April 30, 2026. World Federation of Large Enterprises, April 2026, United States leading economic index, May 2026. Federal Reserve St. Louis, FRED, Sam Rules Declining Indicator, June 2026. 24/7 Wall St., Wall Street considered that the recession risk had receded in 2026 but that the warning signal had flared in 2027, May 11, 2026. Polymarket, US probability of recession by 2026, June 2026. United States News and World Report, 2026 Recession Watch and Preparedness Guide, June 2026. Deloitte Insight, 2026 Q1 United States Economic Forecast, 2026 March. Congress Budget Office, 2026 to 2036 Budget and Economic Outlook, February 2026. United States Treasury Department, TBAC Economic Policy Statement, second quarter of 2026, May 2026. American Bank Asset Management, Consumption Expenditure and Labour Market, May 2026. TransUnion, 2026 Q1 Credit Insight Report, April 2026. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Q1 Family Debt and Credit Quarterly Report 2026, 12 May 2026. Fisher Investments, Background Analysis of the Rising Credit Card Expiry Rate, May 2026. LendingTree, 2026 credit card debt statistics, May 2026. The Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank, yield curve with GDP growth projections。

DISCLAIMER: THIS REPORT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR REFERENCE TO EDUCATION AND GENERAL MARKET INFORMATION AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE OR SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS ANY INVESTMENT PROPOSAL, OFFER, SOLICITATION OR PURCHASE, SALE OR POSSESSION OF ANY SECURITIES, VIRTUAL ASSETS, FINANCIAL PRODUCTS OR FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS. THE PRESENT REPORT CONTAINS, FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY, MARKET ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES AT THE TIME OF ITS ISSUANCE. THE DATA CITED IN THE REPORT AND THIRD-PARTY SOURCES ARE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE AND BIT DOES NOT GUARANTEE THEIR ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS OR TIMELINESS. ANY ECONOMIC FORECASTS, MARKET VIEWS OR SITUATIONAL ANALYSES MENTIONED IN THE REPORT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS GUARANTEES OF FUTURE MARKET PERFORMANCE OR INVESTMENT RESULTS. HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND PAST MARKET DATA DO NOT REPRESENT FUTURE RESULTS。