Hyperliquid, why make less than Coinbase
Original title:"Hyperliquid at the Crossroads: Robin or Nasdaq Economics"
original by: @shaundadevens
Photo by Peggy Block Beats
Editor press:HyperliquidThe size of the deal is approaching the traditional exchange, and what is really of concern is not just the size of the volume, but the level of the market structure it chooses. This paper analyses why Hyperliquid has taken the initiative to adopt low-cost market-level positioning, and how Builder Codes, HIP-3 have taken long-term pressure on the platform while magnifying the ecology。
The path of Hyperliquid mirrors the core problem facing the entire encryption infrastructure: how profits should be distributed when they are larger。
The following is the original text:
Hyperliquid is handling the exchange of perpetuity contracts near NASDAQ, but its profit structure is also characterized by NASDAQ。
Over the past 30 days, Hyperliquid has liquidated a nominal sale of $20.56 billion (approximately $61.7 billion per year on a quarterly basis), but has generated only $8.03 million in transaction revenue at a conversion rate of approximately 3.9 basis points (bps)。
This means that Hyperliquid will be cashed in a way that is closer to a wholesale execution site (wholesale exclusion vue), rather than a high-cost trading platform for the diaspora。
By contrast, Coinbase recorded $295 billion in transactions in the third quarter of 2025, but realized $1,046 million in transaction income, with an implicit rate of about 35.5 basis points。
Robinhod’s liquidity logic in the encryption business is similar: his $80 billion volume of nominal transactions in encrypted assets has generated $268 million in transaction income, with an implicit rate of about 33.5 basis points; at the same time, Robinhod’s nominal sales of shares in the third quarter of 2025 amounted to $647 billion。
Overall, Hyperliquid is among the top trading infrastructure on a transaction scale, but in terms of rates and business models it is more like a low-level executive rather than retail-oriented platform for professional traders。
The gap is reflected not only in the rate level but also in the breadth of the variable dimensions. Retail platforms tend to benefit from multiple income interfaces. During the third quarter of 2025, Robinhood realized $730 million in transaction-related income, in addition to $456 million in net interest income and $88 million in other income (mainly from Gold subscriptions)。
By contrast, Hyperliquid is currently much more dependent on transaction fees, which are structurally reduced at the protocol level to a single-digit base point. This means that the income model of Hyperliquid is more centralized, more homogeneous, and closer to low-cost, high-swirling infrastructure players than a retail platform for deep realization through multiple product lines。
This in essence can be explained by location differences: Coinbase and Robinwood are voucher/distribution-type businesses that are multilayered by balance sheets and subscription systems; and Hyperliquid is closer to the exchange level. In traditional financial market structures, profit pools are naturally divided into two layers。
Proker-Dealer vs Exchange (Exchange) model
In traditional finance (TradFi), the central division is the separation of the distribution layer from the market layer。
Retail platforms such as Robinhod, Coinbase, located in the distribution sector, can capture the realization of the high Maori; and exchanges such as Nasdaq, located at the market level, whose pricing rights are structurally limited and whose enforcement services can be competitively driven towards a commercialized economic model。
Securities dealers / brokers = distribution capacity + customer balance sheets
The issuer has customer relations. Most users do not have direct access to Nasdaq, but are entering the market through coupons. The issuer is responsible for opening accounts, hosting, deposit and risk management, customer support, tax documents, etc., and then diverting orders to the specific place of dealing。
This is the type of "relationship ownership" that allows the voucher to perform multiple liquidations outside the transaction:
Funds and asset balances: cash-to-asset spreads, bond lending, securities lending
Packing of products: subscription services, functional packages, bank cards / investment products
Route economics: coupons control the flow of orders, and payment or revenue-sharing mechanisms can be embedded in the route chain
This is why issuers tend to earn more than they do in places of trade: profit pools are really concentrated in the "distribution plus balance" position。
Exchange = setup + rule + infrastructure, extraction limited
The exchange operates the place of dealing itself: a blending engine, market rules, certainty enforcement and infrastructure connectivity. The main modalities of realization include:
Transaction fees (continuously low in highly mobile products)
Return to domestic service / mobility incentives (most of the nominal rates are returned to the market, often in order to compete for mobility)
Line data, network connection and room co-location
Listing fees and indexing authorizations
Robinhod ' s order route mechanism clearly demonstrates this structure: the user relationship is held by the voucher (Robinhod Securities), the order is then routed to the centre of a third party market, where the economic benefits of the route are distributed through the chain。
The real high-māori layer is at the distribution end, which controls customers, user relationships, and all realizations surrounding execution (e.g. order stream payments, bonds, securities lending and subscription services)。
nasdaq itself is on the lower level of the profit margin. the products it provides are essentially highly commodified enforcement capacity and queue access, while its pricing rights are strictly limited in terms of mechanisms。
the reason for this is that, in order to compete for mobility, the place of the transaction often requires a substantial return of nominal fees in the form of a person returning to the market as a domestic servant; that there is a regulatory cap on access fees (accessee), which limits the space available for the charge; and that the order route is extremely flexible and funds and orders can quickly be exchanged between different trading places, making it difficult for any single site to raise prices。
This is reflected in the financial data disclosed by NASDAQ in a very intuitive way: the net proceeds actually captured in cash stock transactions are usually only a few United States dollars per share. This is a direct picture of the structural compression of the profit space of the market-level exchange。
The strategic consequences of this low profitability are also clearly reflected in changes in the income structure of NASDAQ。
In 2024, Market Services (market services) income from NASDAQ was $1020 million, or 22 per cent of total income of $4,649 million; this proportion was as high as 39.4 per cent in 2014 and still stood at 35 per cent in 2019。
This continuing downward trend is in line with the initiative of NASDAQ to move from a highly market-dependent, profit-limited implementation to a more regular, predictable software and data business. In other words, it is the structurally low profit space at the level of the exchange that drives NASDAQ to move gradually from its growth focus to its "conciliation and implementation" to its "technology, data and service-based products."。
Hyperliquid as "market level"
Hyperliquid has an effective rate of achievement of about 4 base points (bps), which is in line with the positioning of its intentionally selected market layer (market player). It's building a chain of NASDAC trading infrastructure:
High-intensity bonding, bonding and clearing systems with HyperCore as their core, using the marker / taker pricing and back-to-market mechanisms, are aimed at maximizing the quality of implementation and sharing of liquidity rather than at multi-layer liquidity for retail users。
In other words, the design of Hyperliquid is not focused on subscriptions, balances or distribution-type income, but rather on providing a commodified but highly efficient capacity for implementation and settlement — a characteristic feature of the market layer and a corollary of its low-cost structure。
This is reflected in the fact that most of the two encrypted trading platforms have not really landed, but are typical of the structural segmentation in traditional finance (TradFi):
One is a non-licensed issuer / distribution level。
Builder Codes allows third-party trading interfaces to be built on core trading sites and to collect economic benefits on its own. Of these, the Builder fees are clearly capped: up to 0.1 per cent (10 basis points) for the renewal of contracts and up to 1 per cent for the spot, and can be set at a single order level。
This mechanism thus creates a competitive market at the distribution level, rather than mono-official applications monopolizing user access and liquidity。
THE SECOND IS THE UNLICENSED LISTED/PRODUCT LAYER (HIP-3)。
In traditional finance, exchanges usually control listing approval and product creation. The HIP-3 externalizes this function: developers can deploy durable contracts for the succession of the HyperCore set-up engine to the API capability, while the definition and operation of the specific market is the responsibility of the deploying。
IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, THE HIP-3 DEFINES THE INCOME-SHARING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLACE OF TRADING AND THE PRODUCT LAYER: THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SPOT AND THE HIP-3 LASTING CONTRACT MAY RETAIN UP TO 50 PER CENT OF THE TRANSACTION FEES FOR THE ASSETS IT DEPLOYS。
Builder Codes has shown results at the distribution end: As of mid-December, about one third of users did not trade through primary interfaces, but through the front end of third parties。
The problem is that this structure, which facilitates distribution expansion, in itself creates constant pressure on the level of the place of trade:
1. Pricing is compressed。
Multiple front-end sales of the same set of bottom liquidity will naturally reduce to the lowest combined transaction costs; and Builder fees can be flexible at the order level, further pushing prices down。
2. Losses of liquidity。
The front-end captures the opening of accounts, product packaging, subscription services and full trade workflows, thus capturing the high-māori space at the voucher level; and Hyperliquid can only retain a thinr layer of exchange。
3. Strategic route risk。
Once the front end has evolved into a genuine cross-site router, Hyperliquid may be forced to enter a wholesale execution competition and guard the order stream only through reduced or higher fees or higher returns。
Overall, Hyperliquid is consciously choosing low-profit market-level positioning (through HIP-3 and Builder Codes), while allowing a high-profit voucher layer to grow over it。
If the front end of Builder continues to expand, they will increasingly decide on user-oriented pricing structures, master user retention and liquidity interfaces, and acquire bargaining power at the route level, creating long-term structural pressure on the grade rate of Hyperliquid。
Defense of distribution rights and introduction of non-exchange-type profit pools
The most immediate risk is commercialization。
If the front end of a third party can press the primary interface for a longer time at lower prices, and eventually cross-site route, Hyperliquid will be pushed to a wholesale-implemented economic model。
Recent design adjustments show that Hyperliquid is trying to expand new sources of income while avoiding this outcome。
Distribution defence: maintaining economic competitiveness at the front end of life
An earlier pledge discount scheme that allowed Builder to obtain a maximum 40 per cent fee discount through the pledge HYPE actually provides a less structured path to the front end of a third party than the primary Hyperliquid interface. The withdrawal of this programme amounts to the elimination of direct subsidies for external distribution at “press prices”。
At the same time, the HIP-3 markets were initially positioned for distribution mainly through Builder and not at the front end of the main front; however, they have now begun to be displayed at the front end of Hyperliquid with strict currency standards。
This signal is clear: Hyperliquid remains on the Builder level without permission, but not at the expense of its core distribution rights。
USDH: From trading to monetization
The USDH was launched with the aim of regaining the revenue of the stable currency reserves that would have been seized outside the system. Its open structure is a 50-50 share of reserve earnings: 50 per cent for Hyperliquid and 50 per cent for USDH ecological growth. At the same time, the discounts on transaction costs provided to the USDH-related markets further reinforce this trend: Hyperliquid is willing to give economic concessions to individual transactions in exchange for a larger, more adhesive profit pool tied to balances。
In terms of effect, this amounts to the introduction of a similar revenue source for the agreement, whose growth depends on the size of the monetary base, not just nominal turnover。
Portfolio Margin: Introduction of finance economics similar to that of primary brokers
Portfolio bonds harmonize the security of the spot with the contract of durability, allow for offsets between the different openings and introduce the original lending cycle。
Hyperliquid will retain 10 per cent of the interest paid by the borrower, making the economic nature of the agreement increasingly dependent on the leverage and interest rate levels, not just the volume of the transaction. This is closer to the income model of the voucher/master broker (prime), rather than purely exchange logic。
The path of Hyperliquid to the coupon model economy
At the level of throughput, Hyperliquid has reached the size of a front-line trading site; but it is still like a market layer in terms of realization: very high nominal turnover, combined with effective single-digit base points. The gap with Coinbase, Robinwood is structural。
Retail platforms are located at the top of the voucher chain, mastering user relationships and fund balances, allowing the simultaneous realization of multiple profit pools (financing, idle cash, subscriptions), while purely trading places sell enforcement services, where natural commodification is carried out in competition for liquidity and route, and netting is continuously compressed. NASDAQ is the TradFi reference for this constraint。
Early on Hyperliquid clearly leaned towards the prototype of the trading place. By dividing the distribution layer (Builder Codes) and the product creation layer (HIP-3), it accelerates ecological expansion and market coverage; the cost is that the architecture may also push economics outward: Hyperliquid runs the risk of being pushed into thin wholesale execution orbit once the front end of the third party decides on aggregate prices and is able to cross the site route。
However, recent moves have shown a conscious shift towards defending distribution rights and extending revenue sources to “balance-based” profit pools without renouncing the advantage of uniform enforcement and liquidation。
SPECIFICALLY: THE AGREEMENT IS NO LONGER WILLING TO SUBSIDIZE THE EXTERNAL FRONT END AT A LOWER STRUCTURAL COST THAN THE ORIGINAL UI; THE HIP-3 IS A MORE PROTOCHEMICAL DEMONSTRATION; AND A BALANCE SHEET SOURCE OF INCOME IS INTRODUCED。
THE USDH PULLS THE RESERVES BACK TO ECOLOGY (FIFTY-FIVE SPLITS AND DISCOUNTS ON THE USDH MARKET); AND THE PORTFOLIO BOND INTRODUCES FINANCE ECONOMICS BY DRAWING 10 PER CENT OF INTEREST ON BORROWING。
Overall, Hyperliquid is condensing into a hybrid model, where the orbit is used as a base, superseding the distribution defence and balance-driven profit pools. This reduces the risk of being trapped in low-base, wholesale trading places, while at the same time aligning with the commercial revenue structure of vouchers without sacrificing the advantages of uniform enforcement and liquidation。
Looking ahead to 2026, there is an open question as to whether Hyperliquid can move further towards a coupon economy without undermining its "outsourcing friendly" model. USDH is the clearest test: at a level of about $100 million, the expansion of outsourcing appears to be slow when the agreement does not control distribution. An obvious alternative path could have been an UI level default - for example, automatic conversion of approximately $4 billion USDC stocks to primary stable currency (like Binance for BUD)。
If Hyperliquid is to truly capture the margin of profit, it may also need to act in a commercial manner: greater control, closer integration of primary products, and a clearer boundary with ecological teams in terms of distribution and balance competition。
